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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: The Dutch implementation of the black border provision in the 2001 European Union 
Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) is studied to examine the implications of tobacco industry 
inv lvement in the implementation phase of the policy process.  
Methods: A qualitative analysis was conducted of Dutch government documents obtained through 
Freedom of Information Act requests, triangulated with in-depth interviews with key informants and 
secondary data sources (publicly available government documents, scientific literature, and news 
articles).  
Results: Tobacco manufacturers’ associations were given the opportunity to set implementation 
specifications via a fast-track deal with the government. The offer of early implementation of the 
labelling section of the TPD was used as political leverage by the industry, and underpinned by 
threats of litigation and arguments highlighting the risks of additional public costs and the benefits to 
government of expediency and speed. Ultimately, the government agreed to the industry’s 
interpretation, against the advice of the European Commission.  
Conclusions: The findings highlight the policy risks associated with corporate actors’ ability to use 
interactions over technical product specifications to influence the implementation of health policy 
and illustrate the difficulties in limiting industry interference in accordance with FCTC Article 5.3. The 
implementation phase is particularly vulnerable to industry influence, where negotiation with 
industry actors may be unavoidable and the practical implications of relatively technical 
considerations are not always apparent to policymakers. During the implementation of the new TPD 
2014/40/EU, government officials are advised to take a proactive role in stipulating technical 
specifications. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Health warnings on cigarette packages are among the most direct means of communicating 
smoking’s health risks. Research indicates that they can discourage youth smoking initiation, 
encourage smoking cessation, and disrupt brand imagery by restricting available package space.[1, 2] 
However, their impact is determined by their design, positioning, and size: with larger warnings both 
improving recall and shaping risk magnitude perceptions.[2, 3] Additionally, there is debate about 
which information should be offered for the warnings to be effective.[4, 5] 
  On 1st May 2002 the Netherlands became the first European Union (EU) Member State to 
introduce new textual health warnings on tobacco packages, following the 2001/37/EC Tobacco 
Products Directive (TPD). Cigarette packages were required to contain a warning label with one of 
two general warning texts covering 30% of the front of the package and a warning label with one of 
14 different texts covering 40% of the back of the package.[6] The Directive included a provision 
stating that the warnings should be “surrounded by a black border not less than 3 mm and not more 
than 4 mm in width which in no way interferes with the text of the warning or information given”.[6] 
Despite the appearance of precision, this guidance permitted two different interpretations, with the 
border either being included in or excluded from the prescribed surface percentages. In practice, 15 
Member States, including the Netherlands, interpreted the provision to mean that a 3 mm border 
should be included in the surface percentages, making the text warnings smaller than if the border 
had been excluded (see Figure 1).[7] However, in the first report on the application of the TPD, the 
Commission stated that the black border should not be counted as part of the warning area.[8] 
  This paper examines how corporate actors shaped this process and builds on two separate 
bodies of knowledge: research on the  implementation of EU legislation, which has typically studied 
how public and elected officials at the national level have influenced the way EU directives are 
implemented in national legislation,[9, 10] and studies of tobacco industry political activity aimed at 
shaping labelling legislation[11-22]. This study analyses industry political activity during the 
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implementation phase of the policy process, focusing on industry actions aimed at policymakers’ 
interpretation of ambiguously formulated EU legislation.   
METHODS 
The analysis is largely based on documents in the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL) 
(http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/). LTDL contains the Dutch Tobacco Industry Special Collection (DTISC), 
which hosts Dutch government documents obtained through two Freedom of Information Act 
requests in the Netherlands in 2000 and 2011 by a Dutch investigative journalist.[23] Between April 
and September 2014, searches of the full LTDL were undertaken using a “snowball strategy”. Initially, 
broad Dutch search terms were used such as “gezondheidswaarschuwing” (health warning) and 
“zwarte kader” (black border). Comparable English search terms and terms relating to the EU 
2001/37/EC TPD were also combined with “Dutch” or “the Netherlands”. Further searches were 
conducted using terms identified from  retrieved information, including names of organisations (e.g. 
‘Vereniging Nederlandse Kerftabakindustrie’; Dutch fine-cut tobacco industry association), policy 
officials and dates of letters and meetings mentioned. 91 documents (33 originating from the DTISC) 
were identified, dated between June 1998 and March 2005. The DTISC documents may not be a 
complete record of written correspondence on the black border, since they were obtained through 
Freedom of Information Act requests.  
 The documents were triangulated with semi-structured interviews with key informants 
conducted by the first author and with secondary data sources. Key informants involved in tobacco 
related issues in the Netherlands during the period 2001-2002 were approached, as were academic 
experts on health warnings. Between July and October 2014 twelve semi-structured interviews were 
undertaken (see Table 1 for a list of interviewees). The Dutch cigar industry association (Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor de Sigarenindustrie; NVS) was also approached, but declined to participate. Upon 
request, representatives of the Dutch fine-cut tobacco industry association (Vereniging Nederlandse 
Kerftabakindustrie; VNK) and the Dutch cigarette industry association (Stichting Sigarettenindustrie; 
SSI) were interviewed together and notes were made, instead of recordings. All other interviews 
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were conducted individually, recorded and final transcriptions were sent to key informants for 
approval. Additionally, the researcher’s account of the interview was sent to the VNK and SSI 
representatives, along with several follow-up questions. Feedback was received, consisting mostly of 
elaborations on existing statements, together with answers to the follow-up questions. The 
introduction of working practices consistent with FCTC Article 5.3, which occurred after the events 
we described, might have distorted how actors - particularly policy makers - think and talk about 
earlier contacts between the government and the tobacco industry. 
  Secondary data sources consisted of publicly available government documents, scientific 
literature, and news articles, obtained through Google searches, government websites, and 
LexisNexis.  
  All textual data were read repeatedly and thematically coded by the first author in an 
inductive manner. Excerpts used of original Dutch texts were translated to English by the first author.  
RESULTS 
The introduction of new health warnings: the black border issue 
On 24th January 2001 the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport (Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport; 
Health) Borst-Eilers published the Draft Labelling Decree for tobacco products. This decree aimed to 
make health warnings and tar- and nicotine yields on tobacco packaging “as clear as possible”.[24] At 
the time, labelling legislation was determined by the EU Directive 89/622/EEC.[25] The Draft 
Labelling Decree, which was set to commence on 1
st
 July 2001, required new typographical 
provisions, but did not propose a change in the text or size of the health warnings.[24] 
  VNK, on behalf of the three tobacco manufacturers’ associations in the Netherlands (SSI, VNK 
and NVS), sent a 20th February 2001 letter to the Director-General of the Health Ministry, pointing to 
the EU TPD provisions, which “will come into force in 2002”.[26] These provisions would go beyond 
those of the Draft Labelling Decree, by requiring significantly larger health warnings and a thicker 
black border, amongst other typographical requirements. Not wanting to have to adjust the warnings 
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twice “within months”, VNK proposed to “combine the adjustments to the Labelling Decree” with 
those required by the TPD.[26] Emphasising that this would limit compliance costs, VNK described 
how the industry had already made preparations to incorporate the TPD’s labelling requirements and 
that requiring other labels would lead to considerable costs, which had not been properly 
considered, since research into the business impacts was lacking.[26]  
  In a 14th March 2001 letter directed to the Parliamentary Committee on Health, the Health 
Minister reiterated the tobacco manufacturers’ associations’ request, indicating that she was “not 
unsympathetic”, but noted that “in return […] the new Directive will have to be implemented in an 
accelerated manner, well before the ultimate deadline.”[27] On 20th March 2001 VNK wrote to the 
Parliamentary Committee on Health referring to this letter, indicating that they were happy with this 
decision and willing to “enter into consultation on the implementation of the forthcoming European 
Directive”.[28] A meeting was held on 7
th
 April 2001, in which SSI showed mock packages with the 
new health warnings with the border included in the surface percentages of 30% and 40% to a Health 
Ministry officer, who responded that they “looked good and were clearly legible”.[29] Additionally, 
on 3rd July 2001 SSI sent their labelling proposals to the Health Ministry in the form of work 
drawings.[29]  
  On 17
th
 July 2001 the adjusted Draft Labelling Decree for tobacco products was published. 
The black border provision was a translation of the EU TPD provision, with no mention of whether 
the border should be included in or excluded from the warning space. Additionally, it stated that 
tobacco manufacturers had already begun to develop a proposal for the warning labels’ technical 
specifications.[30]  
  Deliberations on the placement of the black border began on 20th July when the Health 
Ministry indicated that it should not be part of the warnings’ prescribed surface percentage, as 
described in a 27
th
 July letter from SSI to the Health Ministry.[29] In that letter SSI stated that in their 
preparations tobacco manufacturers had assumed that the borders were to be included in the 
surface area and that the negotiated date (1
st
 March and 1
st
 May for all but a minority of packages) 
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would only be met if the Ministry agreed to attached detailed proposals reflecting this 
assumption.[29] Additionally, SSI stated that “given this date, we need to have a written approval of 
the Health Ministry before the next meeting of the SSI board (9
th
 August), with reference to the 
continued practical preparations and implementation. If we do not hear from you before 9th August, 
we will assume that you agree with these proposals and the SSI members will continue on the course 
they have set.”[29] 
   Based on advice received from the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority 
and several Ministry legal officers, the DG Health director stated in a 10th August 2001 letter to SSI, 
that he could “agree to the viewpoint of SSI that the prescribed black border is part of the required 
warnings.”[31] On 12
th
 September 2001, VNK sent draft technical specifications to the Health 
Ministry indicating that the black border was to be included in the surface percentages.[32] In a 15th 
October 2001 letter NVS also reaffirmed that the border was to be part of the allocated warning 
space.[33]  
  The black border issue was revisited in a  21
st
 November 2001 letter by the Health Minister to 
the three tobacco manufacturers’ associations. In the correspondence she referred to a letter (dated 
28th June 2001) from the European Commission to the United Kingdom (UK) Department of Health 
which she had only become aware of subsequent to the 10
th
 August letter to SSI. She wrote that the 
Commission had stated that the black border was to be added to the prescribed surface percentages, 
instead of included and that “an official opinion of the European Commission could perhaps resolve 
the matter”.[34] In response, SSI on 7th December 2001 expressed their surprise and reminded the 
Ministry that “the whole purpose was to quickly implement the labelling section of the EU 
Directive”.[35] SSI argued that “it makes no sense” to ask the Commission’s opinion as “only the 
European Court of Justice can judge on matters concerning the interpretation of the TPD.”[35] A 7th 
December response letter from VNK referred to the draft technical specification of 12
th
 September 
which had been verbally approved by the head of the Ministry’s tobacco team. The letter stated that 
VNK was continuing its preparations despite not yet having received confirmation of the technical 
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specification and requested written approval of the specification before 19th December 2001. In the 
context of fast-track implementation, they threatened to withhold cooperation by stressing that “the 
voluntary implementation, as the word already implies, is voluntary.”[32] Finally, the letter stated 
that “insofar you are of the opinion that different preparations should be made, VNK and/or her 
members will consider holding the State accountable for the costs of preparations already 
made.”[32] NVS also wrote to the Minister on 10th December 2001, responding to the European 
Commission’s letter to the UK Department of Health.[36] NVS stated that during a Council Working 
Party meeting on 12th/13th January 2000 [37] the Commission had expressed the exact opposite and 
that this, among other things, had formed the basis on which Member States had agreed to the TPD 
proposal.[36]  
  The final document in our sample pertaining to the border discussions between the Health 
Ministry and the tobacco manufacturers’ associations is a letter from the Health Minister responding 
to the above mentioned letters from the tobacco manufacturers’ associations, dated 12th February 
2002.[38] She noted that the definitive amendments to the Labelling Decree had been made official 
on 21st January 2002 [39], the date of entry into force having been set for 1st May 2002. Also, she 
stated that from these definitive amendments it would have become clear that the government “for 
the time being” did not require the black border to be excluded from the prescribed surface 
percentages.[38] This would remain unchanged until the present day.  
Health Ministry perspective 
During the period 2001-2002 the Health Minister, Els Borst-Eilers, was nationally and internationally 
known for her commitment to tobacco control.[40] (Interview managing director STIVORO, interview 
policy officer 3) Two of the four policy officers of the Ministry’s tobacco team, which fulfilled a 
supporting and executive role, dealt with the details surrounding the introduction of the new 
tobacco health warnings. (Interview policy officer 2, interview policy officer 3) When asked about the 
reasoning behind the fast-track implementation, it was mentioned that “in this case the consumer 
would be warned sooner […]. We always thought, the sooner the better.” (Interview policy officer 1) 
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The fact that the Netherlands would be first to implement the new warning labels was a source of 
“pride”, since the Netherlands was usually “rather slow” in these matters. (Interview policy officer 1)  
  On the topic of the black borders, it was said that at the time “we personally did not find it 
that important. We believed that the text of the warnings was more important.” (Interview policy 
officer 1) Tobacco industry lobbying surrounding the introduction of the new health warnings - by 
letter, telephone, email and meetings - was characterised as “extremely proactive” and like “having 
to keep the flies away.” (Interview policy officer 1) One policy officer’s strategy was always to “meet 
as little as possible”. However, whilst officers considered that they “did not need [industry] 
information”, meetings were sometimes required from “higher authorities” to avoid accusations of 
not being prepared to consult and to comply with minimal requirements of stakeholder consultation. 
(Interview policy officer 1) Additionally, business impact assessments meant that the tobacco team 
was "dependent on information from the industry on the business impacts of […] the warnings.” 
(Interview policy officer 1)   
Health organisation perspective 
Amongst Dutch Health NGOs, STIVORO was the main party active on the health warning issue at the 
time. (Interview chair CAN) With regards to an earlier version of the TPD proposal, the managing 
director of STIVORO had advised the Health Ministry in February 2000 to exclude the black border 
from the allocated warning space.[41] This advice was based on a common position formulated by 
European health organisations and health lobbyists at a consensus conference in January 2000, 
although at the time STIVORO considered the warning texts to be of greater significance than the 
black border. (Interview secretary general ENSP, interview managing director STIVORO) 
Tobacco industry perspective 
When interviewed, SSI and VNK representatives highlighted the importance of avoiding needless 
costs “[since] millions are involved in the adjustment of packaging”. Communication with the 
government on the black border was said to be driven by this concern and not “protection of 
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interest.” The industry had lobbied when the TPD could still be adjusted, but once legislation was set 
it only wanted “to implement it as quickly as possible.” (Interview vice chair SSI and current chair 
VNK)  
  When asked about communications between the tobacco manufacturers’ associations and 
the Health Ministry, SSI and VNK representatives mentioned that “the pace of the industry and the 
government is different”, since “the industry always wants to know as quickly as possible how 
something needs to be implemented”.  It was also emphasised that dialogue on technical details of 
implementation benefits both industry and the government. On the one hand, companies need clear 
information on how measures should be implemented to avoid litigation risks. On the other hand, 
dialogue supports policy makers, since they are not always aware of the practical issues involved. 
Industry actors saw it as their “role”  to “relate practice to the Health Ministry” and, therefore, that it 
was important that the industry “arrives at acceptable implementation of legislation together with 
the government”. Industry representatives emphasised that in respect to “technical aspects of 
implementation”, the Health Ministry’s view was that dialogue with industry actors remained 
necessary despite the subsequent introduction of working practices consistent with FCTC Article 5.3.  
(Interview vice chair SSI and current chair VNK) Finally, industry actors emphasised the greater costs 
involved when legislation was implemented differently across EU Member States: “the more 
uniformity, the less divergent packaging material, the less machine changeover time, the less costs”. 
(Interview vice chair SSI and current chair VNK)  
DISCUSSION 
The present study illustrates how in the Netherlands the tobacco industry was able to reduce the size 
of health warnings by successfully exploiting uncertainty over an ambiguous implementation 
provision in the EU TPD’s labelling section. More generally, the findings highlight the policy risks 
associated with government-industry interactions during the implementation phase of the policy 
process and the potential for deliberations over what seem like minor technical specifications to 
have far-reaching health policy consequences. 
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  Case studies of EU Directives in the Netherlands recognise that where a consensus exists 
between public and elected officials over implementation, an interpretation of the Directive 
reflecting the consensus is adopted.[9] This contrasts with circumstances where no consensus exists, 
in which case a literal translation is claimed to follow.[9] What these scenarios ignore, however, is 
the role that non-state actors, in this case corporate actors, play in actively steering public and 
elected officials towards specific interpretations of EU legislation.  
  Our fin ings indicate four techniques that increased the tobacco industry’s leverage in 
discussions over how to implement the TPD. First, tobacco manufacturers’ associations sought to set 
the agenda for implementation by proactively preparing mock packages and work drawings and by 
starting preparations on packaging redesign early on. This technique was underpinned by efforts to 
control the pace of negotiations, which centred on giving the Ministry short deadlines to respond to 
delivered technical specifications. Second, they endeavoured to facilitate acceptance of their 
interpretation by emphasising the importance of expediency and threatening to withdraw their 
earlier offer of fast-track implementation. This technique capitalised on public officials’ professional 
interest in moving forward quickly with public health measures. Third, they sought to preserve the 
essentially private nature of negotiations over TPD implementation by seeking to discourage 
communication between the Dutch Health Ministry and the European Commission and by arguing 
that another policymaking venue (the European Court of Justice) had ultimate responsibility on this 
matter. Although technically correct, the industry’s reaction is consistent with insider political 
strategies that aim to “contain” negotiations in order to optimise control over outcomes.[42] This 
approach was reinforced by efforts to portray the European Commission as having taken an opposing 
view to the Dutch Health Ministry at a Council Working Party meeting, even though the 
Commission’s statements applied to an earlier, abandoned version of the TPD proposal.[37]. Finally, 
tobacco manufacturers’ associations emphasised the additional compliance costs associated with 
contesting their interpretation of the TPD with a view to highlighting the litigation risks (to the state) 
of acting independently and the extra costs this might incur.  
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  These findings illustrate the difficulties that policymakers face in limiting industry 
interference in health policy by restricting government-industry interactions in accordance with FCTC 
Article 5.3.[43, 44] During the TPD implementation phase, the Dutch government gave tobacco 
manufacturers’ associations a legitimate status as “political insiders”[45, 46]. Providing industry 
access to policymakers is often an unavoidable part of implementing health measures that require 
changes to product specifications, a process which is difficult to manage through legal instruments 
alone. This point is underlined by FCTC’s Recommendation 2.1 of the Guidelines for Implementation 
for Article 5.3, which specifies that Parties should interact with the tobacco industry “only when and 
to the extent strictly necessary to enable them to effectively regulate the tobacco industry and 
tobacco products.”[44] The risks of such interactions are intensified by the fact that the practical 
implications of relatively technical considerations are not always apparent to policymakers. 
  Our findings indicate that contrary to what industry actors claimed in interview, corporate 
political activity is an ongoing practice that continues after legislation has been passed. As Parties to 
the FCTC introduce restrictions on industry lobbying, this phase is likely to become an increasingly 
important administrative milieu for corporate political influence, carrying distinctive risks for policy 
formation due to the co-operative dynamic that may emerge. Our findings thus underline the value 
of prescriptive detail in EU tobacco directives, which reduce the scope for negotiation and 
contestation by the industry. In contrast to the TPD border provision, other aspects of the labelling 
section with more precise technical specifications (e.g. on the font and the position of the text within 
the warning labels), were consistently implemented across EU Member States. Although the 
supranational nature of the EU creates practical obstacles in drafting prescriptive detail, the certainty 
provided by this is likely to work for both tobacco manufacturers – who emphasised the cost 
advantages of legislative precision – and public health.  
  Additionally, our results support the findings of existing research which underlines how 
Better Regulation practices are likely to create opportunities for industry lobbying[47, 48]. Our 
findings indicate that estimating cost impacts via impact assessments - a key characteristic of Better 
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Regulation initiatives - may provide an institutional anchor for industry arguments that focus on the 
legal ramifications of additional costs involved in implementation decisions that are inconsistent with 
the industry’s preferred option. Moreover, our results provide further support for the notion that 
impact assessments help to formalise corporate actors’ information advantage in health 
policymaking [49-52].  
   Finally, in accordance with the spirit of Article 5.3, the results underline the importance of 
governments taking a proactive role in stipulating technical specifications concerning the new TPD 
2014/40/EU and carefully considering the implications of tobacco industry information, even when 
such information may be provided in good faith. 
WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS 
• In contrast to previous studies which have examined tobacco industry efforts to shape 
labelling legislation, this paper focuses on the implementation phase of the policy process, 
concentrating on how tobacco industry actors influence political decision-making during the 
implementation of EU legislation.  
• The paper exemplifies the policy risks associated with government-industry interactions 
during the implementation phase of tobacco policy and illustrates the difficulties involved in 
limiting industry interference in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control. In addition, it highlights the importance of government officials taking a 
proactive role in stipulating technical aspects of implementation. 
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Table 1 Interviewed key informants 
Face-to-face interviews (n=4) Telephone interviews (n=8) 
Policy officer 1 from the tobacco team of the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport 
Policy officer 3 from the tobacco team of the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport 
Policy officer 2 from the tobacco team of the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport 
Chair of the non-smokers association Clean Air 
Netherlands (CAN) 
Managing director of the national expert centre on 
tobacco control STIVORO 
Secretary general of the European Network for 
Smoking Prevention (ENSP) 
Vice chair of the Dutch cigarette industry association 
& current chair of the Dutch fine-cut tobacco 
industry association 
Head of strategy and communication of STIVORO 
President of the International Network of Women 
Against Tobacco (INWAT) and member of the ENSP 
 International academic expert 1 on health warnings  
 International academic expert 2 on health warnings 
 International academic expert 3 on health warnings 
 
Figure 1: actual Dutch health warning with border ‘included’ (left), approximation of Dutch health 
warning with border ‘excluded’ (right) 
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(For print publication) 
(Higher resolution images available for each separate package)   
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"The devil is in the detail: Tobacco industry political influence in the Dutch implementation of the 
2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive" 
Tobacco Control 
 
Dear editor,  
Thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to revise our paper on tobacco industry political 
influence in the Dutch implementation of the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive.  
 
We are pleased to hear that you will accept the paper for publication, provided we check and adjust 
the reference list. We have done so accordingly. Please let me (Jessamina), know if any more 
adjustments need to be made.  
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